Revolutionary periods, like Britain underwent in 1642-1688 and Egypt experienced in 2011-2013, are characterized by idealistic goals. So when and why did the idealistic goals of religious toleration and constitutional democracy in Britain and Egypt, as introduced by their respective post-revolutionary rulers James II and Mohamed Morsi, lead to counter-revolutions? Why did religion not stabilize regimes, (unlike Marx's palliative or Alianak's stabilization in times of crisis), but instead led to revolutions and counter-revolutions? This book explores these questions and provides an explanation by introducing a theoretical construct of the presence of sectarian strains in both countries that magnified the unwitting perceived "basic blunders" of these new and inexperienced rulers and hence led to counter-revolutions albeit with different end-results: a constitutional monarchy in Britain with the re-establishment of a "secure" Church of England and a return to a perceived non-sectarian military rule, an illiberal democracy, in Egypt.