Comments on William Jaworski's Essay (2018) "Psychology Without a Mental-Physical Dichotomy"

ebook Peirce's Secondness and Aristotle's Hylomorphism, #16 · Peirce's Secondness and Aristotle's Hylomorphism

By Razie Mah

cover image of Comments on William Jaworski's Essay (2018) "Psychology Without a Mental-Physical Dichotomy"

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William Jaworski considers the modern mental-physical dichotomy from a Neo-Aristotelian point of view. His article appears in "Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives On Contemporary Science" (edited by William M.R. Simpson, Robert C. Koons and Nicholas Teh, 2018, Routledge Press, pages 261-292). This book belongs to the Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science.
These comments take Jaworski's argument one step further, by associating Neo-Aristotelian concepts with Peirce's categorical framework, especially the category-based nested form. The resulting view may be called postmodern neoscholastic.
Why the connection?
Charles Peirce picks up where the Baroque scholastics of the seventeenth century leave off. These comments locate the mental-physical dichotomy within the noumenon, the thing itself, rather than psychological phenomena, based on the character of the Positivist's and empirio-schematic judgments.
'Body [substantiates] soul' belongs to the noumenon of human psychology.
A noumenon cannot be objectified as its phenomena.
Phenomena are the observable and measurable manifestations of a noumenon.
Ramifications become apparent as the commentary proceeds.

Comments on William Jaworski's Essay (2018) "Psychology Without a Mental-Physical Dichotomy"