The separation between ownership and control creates an agency problem, particularly an information asymmetry problem, where market participants believe that managers tend to behave to their own benefits (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Accordingly, any mechanism intended to overcome the information asymmetry problem is profound to the success of the financial market (Ronen & Yaari, 2002). One of the most effective mechanisms in mitigating such problem is keeping investors informed through disclosure which is critical for the functioning of capital market (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Financial statements information is crucial, however, it reflects only one part of the overall firm performance. Since, it focuses only on the short-term results of firms, giving little emphasis to their long-term value potential (Beattie et al., 2004). The International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) argues that "if financial statements are not sufficient to meet the objectives of financial reporting, then the IASB should consider requiring the disclosure of other information to help the financial reports meet their objective" (IASB, 2005, p. 11). The disclosure requirements and practices are growing and the types of information that firms provide to the investors are being changed. Instead of simply providing financial information, companies begin to provide more detailed voluntary disclosures to accommodate investors' needs for information. The under-exploration of corporate reporting in emerging economies was one of the key reasons for proposing this special issue. The Guest Editors have selected papers that examine the determinants and consequences of corporate reporting in emerging economies.