This excellent report, professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, is about intelligence at the operational level of war. It is also about operational design and the 1948-60 anticommunist counterinsurgency known as the Malayan Emergency. Using a dialectic approach, the paper evaluates how operational intelligence should be influenced by emerging concepts of operational design. It analyzes the essence and practice of operational intelligence, considers the commander's role in operational intelligence, and assesses intelligence contributions in the Malayan Emergency. Next it examines operational design, including a design-based reassessment of the Malayan Emergency. Finally, the paper synthesizes studies of operational intelligence and operational design to produce insights and suggestions for commanders and intelligence professionals on performing, educating, training, and equipping operational intelligence.

The project concludes that operational intelligence is more than tactical reconnaissance writ large. It suggests ways to balance the inherent tensions of operational intelligence—those between the strategic and tactical and between collection and analysis—that will improve the effectiveness of the joint force. The project also concludes that operational intelligence and operational design are complementary cognitive processes that, together, can enrich operational art in the information age.

Intelligence and Design * Chapter 1 - Introduction * Chapter 2 - Intelligence at the Operational Level of War * Chapter 3 - The Practice of Operational Intelligence * Chapter 4 - Operational Intelligence and the Commander * Chapter 5 - Operational Intelligence in the Malayan Emergency * Chapter 6 - Design * Chapter 7 - Operational Design * Chapter 8 - Operational Design in the Malayan Emergency * Chapter 9 - A Synthesis of Operational Intelligence and Operational Design * Chapter 10 - Conclusions