This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. In January and February 1991, Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) conducted an air-to-ground onslaught against Iraq's Republican Guard. The requirements of this operation conflicted in a number of respects with the US Air Force's extended preparations for conflict on a European battleground. A major case in point involved the low-altitude tactics CENTAF crews had practiced for the previous decade and a half, tactics that were manifestly unsuited for the task that confronted them in Iraq. Colonel Andrews's study, Airpower against an Army: Challenge and Response in CENTAF's Duel with the Republican Guard, examines how CENTAF adjusted air operations against the Republican Guard to meet the realities of combat. Initial F-16 and B-52 attacks on the Republican Guard met little success. In response, CENTAF instituted six significant tactical innovations in the space of one week: A-10 deep interdiction, A-10 reconnaissance, F-16 killer scout operations, F-16 forward basing, F-111 and F-15E tank plinking, and the use of cockpit videotape as a source for bomb damage assessment. These innovations required CENTAF aviators to create new tactics in the midst of combat operations. Quickly devised and implemented, these new tactics markedly improved CENTAF's effectiveness against the Republican Guard. Critically weakened by air attack, the two guard divisions that stood and fought were annihilated during the ground phase of Operation Desert Storm.