Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this study examines the role of military engagement and forward presence in the toolbox of American presidents as they face national security challenges.

Options provide room for maneuver strategically, operationally, and politically. In this monograph, the U.S. Army War College's Dr. John R. Deni argues that some persistent biases and some more recent trends in defense strategy, planning, and budgeting are likely to have the effect of reducing the options available to current and future senior U.S. leaders.

The drawdown of U.S. ground forces from Europe and elsewhere overseas, the return to a focus on major interstate war, the assumption that DoD-led security cooperation detracts from readiness, and the high-profile failure to build capable security forces in places like Iraq and Afghanistan have combined to frustrate American efforts to protect itself, its allies, and its interests. More specifically, these factors have weakened the effectiveness of forward presence and military engagement when it comes to protecting the homeland, conducting counterterrorism operations, assuring allies, and deterring aggressors. In their place, precision strike stand-off capabilities and a strategy of surging American military might from the United States after a crisis has already started have become more attractive policy choices.

However, Dr. Deni posits that these are inherently limited tools, diminishing U.S. influence abroad, incentivizing aggression on the part of adversaries, and ultimately reducing options available to senior American leaders. In their place, Dr. Deni convincingly argues that forward presence and military engagement remain effective, efficient tools in the policy toolbox available to senior leaders. The author is careful to note though that there are some key caveats. First, permanent forward presence — vice merely rotational presence—is particularly beneficial, and potentially not as expensive as commonly assumed, when it comes to assurance and deterrence. Second, military engagement is not a panacea, and policymakers must take care to understand when and where DoD-led security cooperation will have a positive, lasting impact.