'Lloyd George at War, 1916–1918' provides a much needed re-evaluation of this charismatic prime minister's wartime leadership. Calling on a wide range of primary sources and focussing on Lloyd George's role in the war cabinet, Cassar compellingly argues that George's reputation as the "man who won the war" was wholly unmerited. Instead Cassar shows that Lloyd George's heavy handed leadership was often detrimental to the Allied cause. From his wholehearted support for the disastrous Nivelle offensive, to his pursuit of a peripheral strategy that diverted troops away from the critical theatre of war on the Western Front, Cassar shows that Lloyd George consistently bucked the advice of his generals in preference for ineffectual and dangerous military strategies. Cassar's approach also differs from that of other studies of Lloyd George by adopting a thematic approach in preference to a chronological narrative, thereby allowing a closer evaluation of Lloyd George's handling of complex issues.