This study investigates the role that logistics played in the failure of the German Offensive in the Ardennes in 1944. The thesis explains that despite the incredible build-up of forces and supplies, the inability of the German strategic and operational logistics systems to properly equip, fuel, arm, and move forces caused the failure of the Ardennes Offensive. The concept of this thesis starts with the overall strategic military and political situation of Germany in the fall of 1944 that Hitler used to base his decision to conduct the offensive in December 1944. The study then examines in detail the strategic capabilities during the build-up of supplies and the operational level organization and planning for the offensive. An analysis of the details on the impact of terrain, climate, allied air interdiction, and Operation Point Blank is included in this chapter. Then it examines the first weeks of the offensive and looks at the failure of the fuel and arm and move tactical logistics functions. An analysis of the impact of logistics on supporting operations is included in this chapter.