This book, the second of two volumes, focuses on scientific cognition, computationalism, and scholars' reception of what Lorenzo Magnani named "eco-cognitive" views on the mind. The authors of these chapters address complex questions, which regard, in part, Magnani's contributions in the field of model-based science, the role of inferential models in mathematics, the transformations and possible applicability of Charles Sanders Peirce's and Immanuel Kant's concepts and insight into current understanding of scientific progress, and the still unsolved questions regarding the methodological steps that take researchers to scientific discoveries. Some contributions also address the problematic understanding of artificial agents as "intelligent," how cognition can be discussed within the limits of computationalism, and how the eco-cognitive perspective on the mind also affects the conception of scientific reasoning and socially constructed phenomena. The book is of great interest to those interested in epistemology, philosophy of science, mathematical logic and AI.