Christopher J. Austin publishes chapter 8 in Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science (edited by William M. R. Simpson, Robert C. Koons and Nicholas J. Teh, 2018, Routledge Press, New York, pages 185-209). He argues that hylomorphism is empirically implicated in developmental biology. This is an interesting proposition.
Using the tools of the triadic structure of judgment, the category-based nested form and, most importantly, the dyadic structure of Peirce's category of secondness, I argue that Aristotle's hylomorphism matches Peirce's secondness. Plus, Aristotle's hylomorphism resides in the noumena in the Positivist judgment. These associations have tremendous implications.
Hylomorphism, especially the realness of form in developmental biology, turns out to be a metaphysical guarantor of empiricism. Without a metaphysical noumenon, which cannot be objectified as its phenomena, modern science ends and postmodern "sciences" begin.